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10.1  Introduction 
In a recent article, Hsieh and Miller (1990) analyze the relationship between 
official Federal Reserve margin requirements and the variability of the market 
factor over the time period from October 1934 to December 1987. While de- 
tecting the expected negative relation between changing margin levels and the 
total amount of outstanding margin credit, the authors conclude that the earlier 
findings of  Hardouvelis  (1988,  1990)-findings  purporting  to  document  a 
definite negative correlation between margin levels and stock price volatility- 
are the result of substantial autocorrelation problems inherent in Hardouvelis’s 
tests. Following correction of these problems, Hsieh and Miller state that “[tlhe 
data thus offer no support for the view . . .  that Federal Reserve margin require- 
ments are an effective tool for dampening stock market volatility” (28). 
While the findings of Hsieh and Miller (1990) provide definitive answers to 
many questions concerning the magnitude and direction of changes in Federal 
Reserve margin levels and stock market linkages for marginable equity securi- 
ties, the extent to which changes in margin levels affect marginable  stocks 
relative to their nonmarginable  counterparts remains unknown. Clearly, the 
S&P Composite index represents the only well-diversified daily market proxy 
available for the study of all twenty-one changes in Federal Reserve margin 
levels mandated  since the passage  of  the Securities Exchange Act of  1934. 
Unfortunately, since all the securities included in this index over the 1937 to 
1974 interval  were  listed  on  either the New York  or American  Stock Ex- 
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changes, they were also all subject to the full range of margin borrowing con- 
straints imposed by changes in margin levels. Thus, index-based margin stud- 
ies  such  as those  of  Hsieh  and  Miller  (1990)  and  others  have necessarily 
compared the performance of the same market index over two different inter- 
vals of calendar time. Given the precepts of market efficiency and the conse- 
quent poor forecasting performance of state-of-the-art return generating mod- 
els, it is clear that the most appropriate test of the effectiveness of changes in 
stock market margin requirements at reducing “undesirable” security market 
perturbations would be between otherwise identical securities differing only 
with respect to the presence or absence of  Federal Reserve margin  require- 
ments. Indeed, in the absence of such a test, it is virtually impossible to distin- 
guish, at the time of the announcement of a change in Federal Reserve margin 
levels, those adjustments in security market behavior resulting from informa- 
tion effects only from those changes resulting from shifts in binding borrowing 
constraints on equity investors. Fortunately, a 1969 amendment to the Securi- 
ties Exchange Act of  1934 allows for the development of margin-change tests 
that, while failing to meet the strictest requirements of a pure empirical duality, 
are based on pairs of over-the-counter  (OTC) firms similar in many important 
respects while differing in marginability status. Accordingly, this study pres- 
ents the results of tests of the price, volatility, volume, and liquidity differences 
registered by both marginable and nonmarginable OTC stocks in response to 
the  1970, 1971, 1972, and  1974 changes in Federal Reserve margin require- 
ments. 
10.2  Margin Requirements and OTC Firms 
The Securities Exchange Act of  1934 completely prohibited  securities bro- 
kers and dealers from extending margin credit for the purchase of OTC stocks. 
The apparent purpose of  this restriction was to eliminate the possibility  that 
unsophisticated investors could become too deeply entangled in margin bor- 
rowing on smaller, potentially lower quality securities. Interestingly, although 
brokers  and dealers were prohibited from extending  margin  loans on OTC 
stocks, commercial banks were not subject to margin restrictions. Rather, these 
institutions could freely lend against OTC equities to any levels they chose. 
In July  1969, the Securities Exchange Act of  1934 was amended to allow, 
for the first time, securities dealers and brokers  to extend margin credit on 
certain unlisted (OTC) equity securities. According to official Federal Reserve 
memorandums, the change in the law was effected at the request of numerous 
security  dealers in an  attempt to provide  a more level playing  field for the 
merging OTC equity market and to help improve the efficiency of the market. 
In addition to allowing brokers and dealers the ability to extend margin credit, 
the amendment (P.L. 90-437) also limited the margin lending powers of com- 
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ulatory requirements  of  both sets of  changes are embodied in regulations T 
and U (as amended) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
The actual criteria for determining exactly which, if  any, OTC securities 
could be margined was left to the discretion of  the Federal Reserve. Initial 
margin eligibility requirements consisted of ten factors, including criteria con- 
cerning corporate age (three years) and time of  public trading (six months), 
market value ($lO,OOO,OOO), capital surplus ($5,000,000),  average share price 
($10.00), and the number of active market makers (five).’  Although the margin- 
list requirements remained largely unchanged over the years encompassing the 
current study’s tests (1970-74),  several changes since that time have occurred, 
the most important of which automatically extends margin status to any firm 
listed  on the National Association  of  Securities Dealers’  (NASD) National 
Market System.2 Maintenance criteria separate and distinct from the require- 
ments established for initial marginability were first established in 1972. Al- 
though, currently, notification of margin status occurs at the time of publication 
of the Federal Reserve’s Official List of  OTC Margin Stocks in the Federal 
Register; in the early years of the OTC margin program, stocks were added to 
the list (or deleted) in the interim between publications as deemed appropriate 
by  the board.3 Over the  1970-74  time period, a total of seven separate OTC 
margin lists were released by the Federal Reserve. Given its importance in the 
development of  the data employed in the empirical tests, the chronology of 
changes in both the Federal Reserve’s margin requirements and the date of first 
publication of  the Federal Reserve’s OTC margin lists from July 8, 1969, to 
September 29, 1975, is summarized in table 10.1. 
10.3  Previous Results 
As noted in the introduction, previous empirical literature on the efficacy of 
Federal Reserve margin regulation has typically been conducted by comparing 
the price and volatility changes of a general market index (such as the S&P 
Composite index) concomitant with changes in margin levels. While differing 
in their various methodologies, studies by Hsieh and Miller (1990), Ferris and 
Chance (1988), and Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) all follow this general proce- 
dure, albeit with occasionally divergent results. While both Hsieh and Miller 
and Ferris and Chance join earlier researchers such as Largay and West (1973), 
Grube, Joy, and Panton  (1979), and the Board of  Governors of  the Federal 
1. Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Official Office Correspondence, March 
1,  1976. 
2. All OTC firms traded on the NASD’s National Market System became eligible for margin 
lending on March 2,  1984 (Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Official Office 
Correspondence, March 2, 1984). 
3.  Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Official  List of  OK  Margin Stocks, 
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Table 10.1  Chronology of Margin Changes and the Release Dates of the Federal 
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First Federal Reserve OTC margin list released 
Federal Reserve reduces margin requirement by  15% 
Second Federal Reserve OTC margin list released 
Third Federal Reserve OTC margin list released 
Federal Reserve reduces margin requirement by  10% 
Fourth Federal Reserve OTC margin list released 
Federal Reserve increases margin requirement by  10% 
Fifth Federal Reserve OTC margin list released 
Federal Reserve reduces margin requirement by  15% 
Sixth Federal Reserve OTC margin list released 
Seventh Federal Reserve OTC margin list released 
Reserve System’s own staff analysis (1984) in maintaining that changes in mar- 
gin levels are associated with only trivial changes in security market behavior, 
Hardouvelis’s investigation, as noted in the introduction, suggests ~therwise.~ 
In work more closely related to the present study, researchers such as Grube, 
Joy, and Howe (1987), Grube and Joy (1988), Seguin (1990), and Wolfe, Klein, 
and Bowyer (1992) examine the price, volume, volatility, and liquidity effects 
of  additions to and  deletions from the Federal  Reserve’s list of  marginable 
OTC securities following passage of  the  1969 amendment to the Securities 
Exchange Act of  1934. The findings of each of these studies are summarized 
below. 
Grube, Joy, and Howe (1987) perform an event-time analysis of the price 
impact of additions and deletions of selected OTC firms to the Federal Reserve 
Board’s Official List of  OTC Margin Stocks. Using ninety firms collected from 
three listing dates, weekly data, and two separate return generating models, the 
authors identify significant price increases in the week of margin eligibility but 
not in the week of delisting. Taken separately, the positive price listing results 
point  toward  either an  implied  Federal  Reserve  “endorsement”  effect  or a 
credit convenience effect, while the delisting results seemingly indicate no ef- 
fect at all. However, as Grube, Joy, and Howe note, when the two sets of results 
are integrated and the regulation T “grandfather clause” is acknowledged, the 
4.  Additional empirical work on the effectiveness of Federal Reserve margin requirements has 
been  conducted by  Moore  (1966), Friend  (1976), Officer  (1973),  Luckett  (1982),  and  Pruitt 
(1993). In general, both Moore and Officer suggest “that not one of the aims of the legislation 
establishing margin  requirements  has  been  accomplished”  (Moore  1966,  158), while Friend, 
Luckett, and Pruitt conclude that “the margin requirement is an effective regulatory tool” (Luckett 
1982, 783). Studies of exchange-specific 100 percent margins by Largay (1973) and Eckardt and 
Rogoff (1976) have generally concluded that the banning of credit transactions in individual secu- 
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empirical results indicate that significant short-term stock price changes ac- 
company Fed credit regulatory activitie~.~ 
In a companion study, Grube and Joy (1988) analyze the volatility effects of 
additions to the OTC margin list. Again using ninety firms and weekly price 
data, Grube and Joy fail to support the hypothesis that additions to the OTC 
margin list result in reductions in overall return volatility. Rather, the authors 
note that the Federal Reserve appears to select OTC stocks for inclusion on 
the broker loan list after they experience a decline in relative return variance. 
Seguin  (1990) employs daily  return  data for approximately  2,400 firms 
added to the OTC margin list from 1976 to 1987 to test the hypothesis that 
margin trading leads to destabilizing price and volatility effects. Noting that 
stock trading volumes increase by  about  15 percent,  overall price  volatility 
declines by about 2 percent and stock prices increase by about 2 percent upon 
margin listing. Seguin concludes that, if there is an OTC margin effect, “it is 
value” (  120). 
Wolfe, Klein, and Bowyer (1  992) perform an analysis similar to that con- 
ducted by  Seguin (1990), with the exception that Wolfe, Klein, and Bowyer 
examine price effects across firms of differing market value. Those authors 
interpret that their findings of no excess returns upon listing for stocks in the 
largest  market  value portfolio,  but  highly  significant  abnormal  returns  for 
smaller firms, are consistent with “the Federal Reserve endorsement theory 
since, under the credit convenience theory, positive excess returns should be 
realized without regard to the market value of the [listed] company” (94). This 
hypothesis is also consistent with the lack of any price effects at the time of 
delisting, since the process employed by  the Federal Reserve for deleting a 
stock from the list is quite protracted.6 In contrast to the findings of Seguin 
(1990), Wolfe, Klein, and Bowyer are unable to document any statistically sig- 
nificant volume changes in the newly marginable firms. In addition, no statisti- 
cally significant net changes in the average bid-ask spread are observed follow- 
ing margin listing. 
While the studies of Grube, Joy, and Howe (1987), Grube and Joy (1988), 
Seguin (1990), and Wolfe, Klein, and Bowyer (1992) represent important con- 
5. The regulation T “grandfather clause” states that any security removed from the OTC margin 
list can, at the discretion of the broker, continue to qualify for preexisting broker loans. This fact 
suggests that  strong credit-motivated  selling pressure  need not  arise  for newly delisted OTC 
stocks. 
6.  The process involved in removing a stock from the OTC margin list begins when the Federal 
Reserve sends a registered letter to the firm stating that the firm is under review. This letter must 
be sent at least one month, and usually is sent more than one month, before the effective date of 
delisting. Since the Federal Regisfer is the official organ employed in the notification of delisting, 
and since, over the time period encompassed by the Wolfe, Klein, and Bowyer (1992)  study (1985- 
87). changes to the margin list were published once per quarter, the notification letter could be out 
as long as three months before official publication in the Federal Register. Not surprisingly, firms 
subject to delisting also have the right to appeal the Federal Reserve’s ruling, a process that, if 
followed, further increases the lag from first notification to final delisting. 322  Stephen W. Pruitt and K. S. Maurice Tse 
tributions to the literature, none of these efforts deals directly with the impact 
of changes in margin levels on OTC firms. In fact, being concerned solely with 
the valuation effects of additions to (and deletions from) the Federal Reserve’s 
OTC margin lists, these studies are inherently incapable of differentiating be- 
tween those security market responses resulting from the information effects 
associated with margin listing (e.g., the Federal Reserve “endorsement effect”) 
and those effects resulting from changes in binding borrowing constraints on 
equity investors due to changes in margin. 
10.4  Data and Empirical Methodology 
10.4.1  Data 
As stated above, the purpose of this study is to establish a controlled experi- 
ment capable of distinguishing between adjustments in security-market behav- 
ior resulting from information efsects only and those changes due to shifts in 
margin-imposed binding constraints on equity investors. As such, all of  the 
tests presented in section 10.5 are based upon specially matched OTC security 
pairs constructed from the seven OTC margin lists noted in table  10.1. The 
purpose of the matched pairings is to create the most homogeneous samples 
possible for study of the effects of changes in Federal Reserve margin levels 
on both  marginable  (experiment) and nonmarginable  (control)  OTC firms. 
Since over the 1970-74 time interval each of  these listings warn that “[s]tocks 
will be added to the List, or deleted, in the interim between publications  as 
deemed appropriate by the Board,” extreme care is taken to ensure that firms 
placed in either the marginable or nonmarginable portfolios for each margin 
change are categorized properly. Thus, a stock is considered for inclusion in 
the marginable firm portfolio for a given margin change only if it appeared on 
those OTC margin listings published both before and after the change.’ Simi- 
larly, a stock is considered for inclusion in the nonmarginable portfolio only 
when its first appearance on the OTC margin list occurs on the second OTC 
firm margin listing following the margin change. 
For example, firms included on both the OTC margin lists released on July 
8, 1969, and July 20,  1970, are considered eligible for inclusion in the mar- 
ginable firm portfolio for the 15 percent margin decrease announced on May 
6, 1970. Similarly, firms are considered eligible for the nonmarginable portfo- 
lio only when first included on the OTC firm margin list released on July 12, 
1971. In addition to ensuring  that each included firm is indeed either mar- 
ginable or nonmarginable as of the date of a given margin change, this proce- 
dure eliminates the possibility that a firm’s margin status might have changed 
7. Otherwise apparently eligible OTC firms reported in the Federal Register as having been 
removed from the Federal Reserve’s OSJicial  List of  OTC Margin Stocks are also eliminated during 
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over the parameter estimation intervals required by the conducted tests8  This 
latter point is particularly critical, given the parameter estimation biases that 
might result from the price, volume, and volatility effects associated with OTC 
firm additions to the list of marginable securities. (See, e.g., Seguin [1990]; 
and Wolfe, Klein, and Bowyer [1992].) 
Since the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) OTC daily data 
tape begins in 1976, and since the last change in Federal Reserve margin levels 
occurred in 1974, all of the data employed in the present study are necessarily 
collected by hand from various quarterly issues of the ZSL  OTC Stock Price 
Guide9 Because of  the desire to employ daily data in the analysis and the 
extremely high opportunity costs associated with hand collection, a total of 20 
marginable and 20 nonmarginable firms are included in each of the OTC firm 
pair groupings employed in the empirical tests for each of the four post-1969 
amendment margin changes. For each of these 160 firms, closing bid and ask 
prices are collected over event days t = -  I26 to +25, relative to the day 0 
margin change date. Additionally, since daily trading volume data are included 
in the ISL OTC guides beginning in  1972, volume data for the 40 matched 
pairs (80 firms) employed in tests of the 1972 and 1974 margin changes also 
are collected over event days t = -  126 to +25. Combining these two security 
series results in a final data set exceeding sixty thousand individually hand- 
collected points. 
The actual mechanics for determining which firms are included in the analy- 
sis is straightforward. Following the determination of which firms are poten- 
tially available for inclusion in both the marginable and nonmarginable portfo- 
lios  for  each of  the  four margin  changes,  subsets  of  these  firms are then 
matched on the basis of four-digit industrial SIC codes. Since the set of poten- 
tial nonmarginable firms is typically much smaller than the set of available 
marginable firms, in approximately 70 percent of all cases more than one (and 
as many as six) four-digit SIC code-matched  marginable firm are available for 
pairing with each nonmarginable firm. In these instances, additional matching 
criteria based on both similarities in market value and debvequity ratios are 
employed to complete the margin pairings. While the market value matching 
criterion requires no justification here, debdequity ratios are included in the 
matching process as an attempt to control for the plausible  possibility  that 
some investors might view margin and corporate borrowing as substitutes in 
8. The OTC marginable/nonmarginable inclusion criteria for the 1971, 1972, and 1974 margin 
changes are as follows: 1971 marginable, included on the 7/20/70, 7/12/71, and 5/15/72 margin 
lists; 1971 nonmarginable, included on the 9/4/73 margin list, but not on the 7/12/71 or 5/15/72 
list;  1972 marginable, included on  the 5/15/72 and 9/4/73 margin lists:  1972, nonmarginable, 
included on the 1/3/74 list, but not on the 5/15/72 or 9/4/73 list; 1974 marginable, included on the 
9/4/73, 7/29/74, and 9/29/75 margin lists; and 1974 nonmarginable, included on the 9/29/75 list, 
but not on the 9/4/73 or 7/29/74 list. 
9. Unfortunately, attempts to employ an optical scanner in the collection of the data proved un- 
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the sense of the “homemade leverage” arguments proposed by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) and others.“’ 
10.4.2  Empirical Methodology 
The purpose of  this study is to determine whether the security-market re- 
sponses observed previously in response to changes in Federal Reserve margin 
requirements  are due to information  effects  only or to changes in  margin- 
imposed binding constraints upon investors. The information effects hypothe- 
sis suggests that security-market responses to margin changes result from in- 
novations in expectations concerning either the condition of the stock market 
or the economy as a whole, and that changes in margin levels serve essentially 
as a signaling mechanism employed by the Federal Reserve in the dissemina- 
tion of relevant information to the marketplace. In this case, most securities, 
regardless  of  their  relative  accessibility  of  margin  credit,  should  react  in 
roughly the same magnitude and direction to a given change in margin require- 
ments.” Conversely, the binding constraint hypothesis suggests that security- 
market reactions to changes in margin requirements  should differ across is- 
sues, particularly with respect to cross-sectional differences in the availability 
of margin loans, as margin traders adjust their portfolios in response to changes 
in the lending environment. Accordingly, the standardized abnormal returns 
differences methodology developed below is designed to detect deviations in 
relative price performance between the marginable and nonmarginable portfo- 
lios described above in response to a change in Federal Reserve  margin re- 
quirements. 
Returns for each marginable or nonmarginable firm  i for each event day t, 
t = -  125 . . . +25, follow Seguin (1990) and are calculated as 
where Alt  and A,-,  and B,t and B,,-, are the ask and bid prices for security  i at 
time t and t -  1, respectively, and D,t  is any cash dividend or other cash distri- 
bution accruing to stockholders of firm i at time t. All return calculations are 
corrected for both stock dividends and stock splits, if any. 
Returns for the twenty marginable and nonmarginable firms for each margin 
change are combined into equally weighted portfolio indexes as 
RM~R,~  = (1/20) Err,  and  RNM,,  = (1/20) Cr,r,  (2) 
where RMARr  and RNMR,,  are the mean returns for the marginable and nonmar- 
ginable firm OTC indexes for all 15  1 event days t, respectively. 
20  20 
r= 1  r=  I 
10. Lists of the firms included in the marginable and nonmarginable portfolios are available 
11. Obviously, certain countercyclical issues might well  be  expected  to react in a direction 
from the authors upon request. 
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Abnormal returns for each OTC index j(  j = 2) for each event day t are 
calculated via the market model and are defined as 
(3) 
where R,,  is the daily return of the CRSP value-weighted market index and 
and PI are Scholes-Williams (1977) intercept and slope coefficients estimated 
over event days t  = -100  to  -26,  relative to the day 0 margin change an- 
nouncement, and are defined as12 




where p,  is the estimated first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the market 
index over the period t = -  125 to -  26, and the individual P terms are ordinary 
least squares coefficients estimated from the following three regressions: 




Rl, = “7  + PIRm,-,  + E,,, 
R,, = a, + P,R,,, + E~,, 
Rll = a,+ + P,+R,,?,+,  + E,,, 
t = -124,  . . . , -26; 
t = -124,.  . . 26; 
t = -125,  . . . ,  -27. 
The abnormal returns difference for each event day t, ARD,, is simply the 
arithmetic difference between the abnormal returns for each of the two OTC 
indexes (ARM,, ,  and ARNMR,,)  for each event day t and is defined as 
(9)  ARDi  =  ARMAR.l  -  ARNMR  I 
Note that, by employing a time series of paired abnormal return differences, 
any marketwide cross-sectional dependencies of the abnormal returns are ef- 
fectively purged. The cumulative abnormal returns difference for the interval 
from T,  to T2,  CARD,; is defined as 
N 
CARD,, =  ARD,, 
t= 1 
where N = T2 -  TI  + 1. 
Standardized abnormal return differences for each event day t, SARD,, are 
calculated by dividing the abnormal return differences for each event day t in 
the event interval by the square root of the variance of the ARD, over the 125- 
day estimation interval. Mathematically, 
12. As  expected, given the results of Brown and Warner  (1985), alternative abnormal return 
calculation methods such as the ordinary least squares market model and the market-adjusted 
returns model produce no substantive differences in the results achieved. Further, the results prove 
similarly insensitive to alternative market indexes such as the CRSP value-weighted index and the 
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(11)  SARD, = ARD, I(S;,~)”~, 
where sj,,  is defined as 
and where 
1  -26 
MARD =  ~~  c (ARM,,, -  ARNMR,J. 
125 r=-125 
(13) 
The  cumulative  standardized  abnormal  return  difference  from  T, to  T2, 
CSARD,,,  is defined as 
SARD, 
T2 
CSARD,,  = c 
I ’  r=r,  T,+‘ 
This test statistic is assumed distributed asymptotically unit normal (t)  and 
is employed to determine the significance of each event interval tested for each 
margin change pair. 
10.5  Empirical Results 
10.5.1  Price Tests 
Tables 10.2-10.5  document the daily and cumulative abnormal return differ- 
ences and their associated daily test statistics (t)  between the marginable and 
nonmarginable OTC firm samples for the 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1974 margin 
changes, respectively, for event days t  = -25  to  +25 relative to the day 0 
announcement of each Federal Reserve margin change. Recall, due to the me- 
chanics of the abnormal portfolio return equation (9), a positive abnormal re- 
turn value for a given even day indicates that the price performance of  the 
marginable OTC firm portfolio exceeded that of the nonmarginable OTC firm 
portfolio after adjusting for all market movements. In addition to portfolio- 
specific return data, tables 10.2-10.5  also reproduce the daily and cumulative 
returns of the CRSP equally weighted index for each event day. 
As illustrated in table  10.2, the lack of any positive, statistically significant 
abnormal returns around the time of the 15 percent decrease in Federal Reserve 
margin levels enacted on May 6, 1970, strongly suggests that the performance 
of  the nonmarginable OTC firm portfolio mirrored its marginable OTC firm 
counterpart. While the abnormal return for event day +3 is positive and statis- 
tically significant, it seems extremely unlikely that this finding-occurring  as 
it does a full three days after the margin change-is  the result of  a margin- 
induced change in binding borrowing constraints on OTC firm investors. The 
insignificant rise in the cumulative abnormal returns over event days  +1 to 
+25 (CARD = 3.29 percent, CSARD = 1.79) further underscores the lack of Table 10.2  Price Differences between the Marginable and Nonmarginable OTC 
Firm Portfolios for the 1970 Margin Decrease 
MAR -  NMR  Test Statistics 
Event Day  CRSP Index  x  CRSP Index  (ARD,)  (SARD,)  CARD,,, 
















-  ,0086740 
-.0144620 
.0208060 
-  ,0034220 
-  ,001  1080 




-  ,0050870 
-  ,0107460 
-.0089880 
-.O  133  190 
,0003  140 
-  .0002420 
-  ,0395400 
-.I280480 
-  ,1072420 
-.I106640 
-.  11  17720 
-  ,1372940 
-.I482440 
-  .1360770 
-.I297570 
-. 1348440 
-  .I455900 
-.I545780 
-.2794580 





-  ,0183067 
-  ,0073447 
.0056639 
,0066261 
-  .00446  13 
,00442  12 
,0203  159 
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-  ,5350790 
.5302695 
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-  ,5287942 
1,1754520 
-  ,2924805 
1  .I 136120 
-.0117487 
-  .0266280 
-  ,0096200 
-.0021286 
-  ,0204353 
-.0277800 
-  ,0221  161 
-.0154900 
-  .01995 I3 






Nores: This table documents the daily (ARD,)  and cumulative (CARD)  abnormal return differences 
and associated daily abnormal return test statistics (SARD,)  between a portfolio of marginable and 
nonmarginable OTC firms around the 15 percent decrease in Federal Reserve margin requirements 
enacted on May 6, 1970. Daily and cumulative changes in the CRSP equally weighted index also 
are presented. 
Table 10.3  Price Differences between the Marginable and Nonmarginable OTC 
Firm Portfolios for the 1971 Margin Decrease 
Event Day 
-  25 



























.0082  160 
.OO 16790 
-.0001820 
MAR -  NMR 
x  CRSP Index  (ARD,) 
.OO I3600  .0169072 
-.0153110  ,0116321 
-.0195630  ,0068407 
-  .OO 14020  ,0072385 
,0059540  ,0207235 
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,0264300  -.0029344 
.0383810  -.O  150132 
,0340370  -  .02  I8976 
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.0405210  -.0085862 
,0487370  -  ,002423  I 
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-  ,015 I543 
-  ,0204750 
-.0251437 
-  .0337299 
-  ,036  1530 
-.0356022 
-  ,0159524 
Notes: This table documents the daily (ARD,)  and cumulative (CARD)  abnormal return differences 
and associated daily abnormal return test statistics (SARD,)  between a portfolio of marginable and 
nonmarginable OTC firms around the 10 percent decrease in Federal Reserve margin requirements 
enacted on December 6, 1971. Daily and cumulative changes in the CRSP equally weighted index 
also are presented. Table 10.4  Price Differences between the Marginable and Nonmarginable OTC 
Firm Portfolios for the 1972 Margin Increase 
MAR -  NMR  Test Statistics 
Event Day  CRSP Index  Z CRSP Index  (ARD,)  (SARD,)  CARD, ~- 
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-  ,4546217 
,0171417 
-  .4959964 
,8712687 
-  .05  11793 
-2.2161370 
.0014315 
-  .0167560 
-  ,0026486 
-  .0010588 
-  ,0036798 
-  ,0034062 
-.0029767 
-  ,0040277 
-.0050830 
-  ,00621  78 
-.0061750 
-  ,007413  1 
-.0052382 
-  .o  1040 12 
-.0162990 
Notes; This table documents the daily (ARD,)  and cumulative (CARD)  abnormal return differences 
and associated daily abnormal return test statistics (SARD,)  between a portfolio of marginable and 
nonmarginable OTC firms around the 10 percent increase in Federal Reserve margin requirements 
enacted on  November 24,  1972. Daily and cumulative changes in  the CRSP equally weighted 
index also are presented. 
Table 10.5  Price Differences between the Marginable and Nonmarginable OTC 
Firm Portfolios for the 1974 Margin Decrease 
MAR -  NMR  Test Statistics 
Event Day  CRSP Index  2 CRSP Index  WD,)  WRD,)  CARD,,, 
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-  ,0007229 
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-  .0072027 
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-  ,0226153 
p.0066456 
,0193431 
-  .0094 12 1 







-  ,7323  141 
-  ,4763867 
-2.9095390 
-  I ,620  1560 
-  1.4957680 
-.4395393 
1,2793460 
-  ,6225 135 
-  .49 13417 
,1298889 






,0025  187 
-.0414721 
-.0659681 
-  .0885834 
-  .0952290 
-  ,0758859 
-.OK52980 
-  ,0909986 
-  .  1  1  36665 
Notes: This table documents the daily (ARD,)  and cumulative (CARD)  abnormal return differences 
and associated daily abnormal return test statistics (SARD,)  between a portfolio of marginable and 
nonmarginable OTC firms around the 15 percent decrease in Federal Reserve margin requirements 
enacted on January 3, 1974. Daily and cumulative changes in the CRSP equally weighted index 
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a significant margin-change differential between the marginable and nonmar- 
ginable portfolios. 
Clearly, the lack of  a positive, statistically significant rise in the prices of 
the marginable OTC firm sample relative to their nonmarginable counterparts 
suggests that any pricing revaluations in response to the 1970 margin change 
were due to information effects  only and not due to changes in margin-imposed 
binding constraints on equity investors, at least over the short run. The consis- 
tent downward trend in the level of the CRSP index over event days r = -25  to 
-  1 is consistent with the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve reduces margin 
requirements in response to declining equity price levels. 
Table 10.3 summarizes the findings for the 10 percent decrease in margin 
levels announced on December 6, 1971. Whereas the test statistics for the ab- 
normal returns associated with event days 0 and +  1 indicate a definite margin- 
change differential between the two OTC firm portfolios, the direction of the 
difference (negative) is exactly the opposite of the a priori hypothesis that re- 
ductions in margin levels should result in price increases in marginable OTC 
firms vis-2-vis their nonmarginable  counterparts. As was the case with the 
1970 margin change, the cumulative abnormal return levels registered over 
event  days  t  =  +1 to  +25 are  similarly  inconsistent  with  an  identifiable 
margin-change performance differential between the two OTC firm portfolios 
(CARD = -2.27  percent, CSARD = -1.57). 
The abnormal returns associated with the 10 percent increase in margin re- 
quirements mandated on November 24,  1972, are summarized in table 10.4. 
As before, there is absolutely no evidence presented in table  10.4 that would 
suggest an identifiable differential response between the marginable and non- 
marginable OTC firm portfolios. Indeed, none of the eleven event days imme- 
diately  surrounding the day 0 announcement of  the increase even approach 
significance at conventional statistical levels. Again, the lack of a consistent 
trend in the postannouncement  abnormal returns over event days t = +I to 
+ 25 (CARD = -1.23  percent,  CSARD = -0.98)  underscores the inherent 
price performance similarity of the two portfolios. Similar to  the case of the 
1970 margin decrease, the substantial cumulative return increase registered by 
the CRSP index prior to the announcement  of  the  1972 margin  increase is 
consistent with the hypothesis that changes in equity levels are an important 
input into the Federal Reserve’s margin-change decision calculus. 
In a perhaps initially surprising result, the abnormal return performance of 
the nonmarginable OTC firms substantially and statistically exceeded the per- 
formance of their marginable counterparts at the time of the announcement of 
the final change in Federal Reserve margin levels announced on January 3, 
1974 (table 10.5). Indeed, given the hypothesis that changes in margin levels 
are associated with changes in binding constraints on equity investors, the ab- 
normal return performance of the marginable firms would, if anything, be ex- 
pected to exceed that of the nonmarginable firms. However, the fact that this 
margin change occurred on the second trading day of the year, combined with 
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lio exceeded that of  the nonmarginable portfolio, suggests that the previously 
described inverse correlation between stock returns and firm size around the 
turn of the year (see, e.g., Keim [1983]) may well lie at the root of this empiri- 
cal finding. Over the entire twenty-five-day postevent period, the cumulative 
abnormal return  performance  of  the nonmarginable  firm portfolio exceeded 
that  of  the  marginable  firms  by  over  7 percent  (CARD = -7.21  percent, 
Overall, the pricing results clearly refute the hypothesis that changes in mar- 
gin requirements are associated with changes in binding constraints on security 
investors. Rather, the results for the marginable and nonmarginable firm pairs 
for the 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1974 margin changes provide the strongest em- 
pirical evidence to date that  the pricing dynamics observed by  previous re- 
searchers in response to changes in margin levels are due strictly to informa- 
tion effects common to all equity securities. 
10.5.2  Volatility Tests 
Table 10.6 presents  a preliminary comparison of differences in volatilities 
between the marginable and nonmarginable OTC firm portfolios before  and 
after each margin change. Comparisons  of  the cross-sectional variances  are 
made between the two samples by means of an F-test. Volatility differences (at 
CSARD = -2.96). 
Table 10.6  Across-Sample Comparisons of Means and Variances for the Marginable 
and Nonmarginable OTC Firm Portfolios 
1970  1971  I972  1974 
MAR  NMR  MAR  NMR  MAR  NMR  MAR  NMR 
Preunnouncement Comparisons 
Mean  0.0108  -0.0098  0.0004  -0.0004  0.0022  0.0013 
Variance  0.0025  0.0025  0.0003  0.0001  7.68-5  4.6E-5 
Observations  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Degrees of freedom  24  24  24  24  24  24 
F-statistic  I .0076  2.0619  1.6318 
P(F<f)  0.4928  0.04 I3  0.11 87 
F critical  1.9838  1.9838  1.9838 
Mean  -0.0021  -0.003 I  0.0039  0.0048  0.0022  0.001  8 
Variance  0.0006  0.0009  0.0001  4.OE-5  7.IE-5  0.0001 
Observations  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Degrees of freedom  24  24  24  24  24  24 
F-statistic  1.5933  2.9084  I .7248 
P(F <f)  0. I305  0.0057  0.0945 
F critical  1.9838  1.9838  I .9838 
Postunnouncement Comparisons 
-0.0009  -0.0021 
25  25 
24  24 




-0.0028  0.0017 
0.0002  0.0002 
25  25 




Note: This table presents  preliminary  comparisons of  the differences  in volatility  for the  marginable 
(MAR) and nonmarginahle (NMR) OTC firm  portfolios in the pre-margin-announcement period and the 
post-margin-announcement period for the  1970, 197 I, 1972, and 1974 changes in  Federal Reserve mar- 
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the 5 percent level) between the marginable and nonmarginable firms in the 
preannouncement period (event days t = -25  to -  1) are evident only for the 
1971 margin change. This result also holds for the F-tests of the differences in 
volatility between the two samples over the postannouncement period (t = +  1 
to +25 event days). While the statistically significant differences between the 
volatility of the marginable and nonmarginable OTC firm portfolios both be- 
fore and after the 1971 margin change are interesting, far more important from 
a policy perspective are questions concerning changes in the variances of the 
marginable  firms relative to their nonmarginable  counterparts following the 
announcement of changes in Federal Reserve margin levels. 
To  investigate relative  differences  between  the  marginable  and  nonmar- 
ginable firm samples following the announcement of margin changes, two sep- 
arate methodologies  are employed. The first method, initially developed by 
Ohlson and Penman (1985) and later replicated by Dubofsky (1991), measures 
changes in volatility following a specific event via the observation that squared 
mean daily stock returns are approximately 0.1 percent in order of magnitude 
compared to expected squared returns. Thus, the null hypothesis that Federal 
Reserve margin changes have no effect on stock volatilities may be simply 
restated as E[R:] -  E[R;] = 0, where Ra and R, are the returns on security i 
before and after the margin change, respectively. The statistical approach em- 
ployed is based on the binomial distribution and assumes simply that, if Fed- 
eral Reserve margin changes have no effect on security volatility, the percent- 
age of squared returns following a margin change exceeding those prior to the 
change (p,), for each portfolio for each of the four margin changes, should be 
equal to the random chance probability of 0.5. Thus, 
Z = 2(p, -  0.5)+, 
where n is the number of return pairs.') 
The Z-test to determine the statistical significance of the difference in the 
proportion of the squared returns registered between the marginable and non- 
marginable firms for each margin change is given by 
where n1  and pI  and n2 and p2  are the total sample sizes and proportions of 
squared returns higher following each margin change for the marginable (1) 
and nonmarginable (2)  firm portfolios, respectively. 
13. While Ohlson and Penman employ a day-of-the-week matching procedure in their volatility 
tests, the common events dates of  the present study mitigate the need for such an  adjustment. 
Thus, the squared return for the first trading day following the 1970 margin change is paired with 
the first trading day prior to the margin change for both the marginable and nonmarginable OTC 
firm portfolios, and so on until all twenty-five event days on each side of each margin change are 
included in the analysis. 332  Stephen W.  Pruitt and K. S. Maurice Tse 
Table 10.7 presents the proportion (p)  of cases in which the postannounce- 
ment squared daily return exceeds the matched-pair preannouncement squared 
daily return for both the marginable (MAR) and nonmarginable (NMR) portfo- 
lios, respectively, as well as the Z  values associated with  these  proportions 
(in parentheses). In addition, the table also reports the overall Z value for the 
difference in the  proportions  registered  by  each portfolio  for each margin- 
change announcement. 
As  reported in table  10.7, while there are clearly significant reductions in 
volatility for both the marginable and nonmarginable firms in response to the 
1971, 1972, and 1974 margin changes, there are no statistically significant dif- 
ferences between the volatility responses of the two portfolios for any of  the 
four tested margin changes. Further, the fact that the postevent returns volatil- 
ity of the marginable OTC stocks actually fell following the 1971 and 1974 
margin decreases further underscores the results of earlier researchers such as 
Ferris and Chance (1988), who suggest that changes in margin levels and stock 
return variability are not always inversely correlated. 
In an effort to further evaluate whether there is a different margin-induced 
volatility relationship between the marginable and nonmarginable OTC firms 
around the time of changes in Federal Reserve margin levels, a two-way AN- 
OVA test also is performed. The model tested is 
= I*. + a,  + P,  + Y, + E,,k' 
where Xck is the natural log of  the ratio of  the postannouncement estimated 
variance to the preannouncement estimated variance for firm k in sample i = 
Table 10.7  Squared Daily Return Volatility Differences between the Marginable 
and Nonmarginable OTC Firm Samples around the time of Federal 
Reserve Margin Changes 
Total Firms  Matched Pairs  P 
Marginchange  MAR  NMR  MAR  NMR  MAR 
1970  20  20  500  500  0.501 
1971  20  20  500  500  0.434 
(-2.95) 
1972  20  20  500  500  0.424 
(-3.40) 
1974  20  20  500  500  0.386 
(-5.10) 
(0.05) 
NMR  Z" 
-~  ~ 
0.535  -  1.039 
(1.51) 
0.378  1.803 
0.400  0.77  1 




Notes: This table presents the proportions of cases in which the postmargin squared daily return 
exceeds the matched premargin squared daily return for the marginable and nonmarginable OTC 
firm portfolios around the times of the 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1974 margin changes. This propor- 
tion is denoted by  p  for the marginable (MAR) and nonmarginable (NMR) OTC firm samples. 
The individual margin-change 2-statistic (in parentheses) tests whether p = .05. 
"The Z-statistic test for the difference between the proportions of  the marginable and nonmar- 
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Table 10.8  Results for the Two-way ANOVA Model 
Sum of  Degrees of  Mean 
Source of Variation  Squares  Freedom  Squares  F Ratio  p Value  F Critical 
~~ 
Model  46.892  7  6.699  6.91  0.004  3.23 
Error  147.420  152  0.970 
Corrected total  194.312  159 
Marginability  0.238  1  0.238  0.24  0.621  3.90 
Year  44.581  3  14.860  15.32  O.OO0  2.66 
Interaction  2.072  3  0.691  0.71  0.546  2.66 
Model RZ  = 0.2413 
Notes: This table presents the results of the following two-way ANOVA model: X,,k = p. + a,  + 
p,  + y,, + E,,~,  where Xqkis  the natural log of the ratio of the postmargin announcement estimated 
variance to the premargin announcement variance, p.  is the overall grand mean (a constant), a,  is 
the marginability effect, p,  is the year effect, and y,,is the interaction effect between marginability 
and year. 
marginable, nonmarginable in yearj = 1970, 1971, 1972, 1974; p,  is the over- 
all grand mean, a constant; a,  is the effect of marginability (MAR -  NMR 
effect); pj is the effect of year; yij  is the effect of the interaction between rnar- 
ginability and year; and eiik  is a normally distributed random error with mean 
equal to zero, and variance equal for all i, j,  and k. 
Table 10.8 presents the results of the ANOVA analysis. The null hypothesis 
of  no margin effect on the volatility of the marginable firms relative to their 
nonmarginable  counterparts is that ai = 0. The extremely low significance 
level of ai  (0.62) indicates clearly the lack of a margin-induced volatility dif- 
ferential between the two samples. The high degree of significance of the time 
(year)  variables  underscores  the results  presented  in  table  10.7, while  the 
highly significant F(F = 6.91, p  = 0.0045) and R2  values (R2 = 0.2413) con- 
firm the general goodness of fit of the model. 
Overall, the results presented in tables  10.6-10.8  offer no support for the 
view that changes in Federal Reserve margin  levels lead to changes in the 
underlying return volatility of marginable OTC stocks relative to their nonmar- 
ginable counterparts. Rather, in every test scenario, the volatility results pre- 
sented support the discussion of the pricing results discussed above and sug- 
gest that any changes in return volatility in response to changes in Federal 
Reserve margin levels are due only to information effects and not to shifts in 
binding constraints on security investors. 
10.5.3  Volume Tests 
While early researchers  such as Grube, Joy, and Panton (1979) observed 
statistically significant increases in daily trading volume for the S&P Cornpos- 
ite index around the time of announcement of Federal Reserve margin changes, 
the findings of more recent margin-based experiments employing OTC stocks 
are contradictory. Specifically, Seguin (1990) documents volume increases of 
about 15 percent for stocks added to the Federal Reserve’s list of marginable 334  Stephen W.  Pruitt and K. S. Maurice Tse 
OTC securities. Seguin’s findings suggest that in only three of the first hundred 
postlisting trading days is security trading volume lower than the average of 
the hundred days just prior to listing. Conversely, Wolfe, Klein, and Bowyer 
(1992) document that only 48 percent of the firms in their sample experience 
increases in relative market-adjusted trading volumes following placement on 
the Federal Reserve’s OTC margin list. 
Despite this discrepancy, given the expected positive relationship between 
increases in “speculative activity” and trading volume, it is reasonable to posit 
that, if decreases (increases) in Federal Reserve margin requirements are asso- 
ciated with the loosening (tightening) of  a binding constraint on security in- 
vestors, the average trading volumes of marginable OTC securities should be 
expected to rise (fall) vis-2-vis their nonmarginable counterparts. 
To assess changes in the mean relative percentage trading volumes between 
the two samples, a paired-differences methodology is employed. In these tests, 
the percentage change in the mean daily trading volume for the marginable 
(DTVMAR,) and nonmarginable (DTVNMR,) firms in  each OTC firm pair is 
calculated by taking the natural log of the ratio of the mean daily trading vol- 
ume for the twenty-five event days before the margin change and the twenty- 
five event days following the announcement. Thus, DTVMAR, = In(TVMARcaI 
TVMAR,),  and  DTVNMR,  = ln(TVNMRJTVNMR,),  where  TVMAR,,  and 
TVNMR,,  and TVMARIa  and TVNMRlll  are, respectively, the mean daily trading 
volumes for the marginable and nonmarginable firms in each OTC firm  pair 
before and after each margin change. 
The net change in the daily percentage trading volume for each firm pair 
(OW)  is calculated by subtracting the mean percentage change in daily trading 
volume for the nonmarginable firm of  each OTC firm pair from that of  its 
matched marginable firm, DW  = DTVMARz -  DTVNMR,. Thus, if the mean 
daily percentage trading volume for a given marginable firm increased follow- 
ing a given margin change relative to its nonmarginable counterpart, this dif- 
ference will be positive. The test statistic for the mean difference of the individ- 
ual OTC pair differences for each of the four margin changes is then calculated 
via a standard paired differences t-test. 
Table  10.9 reports the mean daily trading volumes (in thousands of shares) 
and the mean percentage change in daily trading volumes for the firms in the 
marginable and nonmarginable OTC portfolios both before and after the 1972 
and 1974 changes in Federal Reserve margin levels. Recall, daily trading vol- 
ume figures are not reported in the ISL OTC Stock Price Guide prior to 1972. 
Also reported in the table is the mean difference between the changes in per- 
centage trading volumes, the standard error of this difference, and the associ- 
ated test statistic (t). 
As shown in table 10.9, there is no evidence that the 10 percent increase in 
Federal Reserve margin levels announced on November 24, 1972, led to de- 
creases in the relative mean daily trading volumes for the firms included in the 
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Table 10.9  Mean Daily Trading Volume Differences between the Marginable and 
Nonmarginable  OTC Firm Portfolios before and after Federal 
Reserve Margin Changes 
1972 margin increase 
Marginable firm mean trading volume following change 
Prior to change 
Mean percentage change 
Nonmarginable firm mean trading volume following change 
Prior to change 
Mean percentage change 
Mean percentage difference 
Standard error of mean percentage difference 
Test statistic (I) of mean difference 
1974 margin decrease 
Marginable firm mean trading volume following change 
Prior to change 
Mean percentage change 
Nonmarginable firm mean trading volume following change 
Prior to change 
Mean percentage change 
Mean percentage difference 
Standard error of mean percentage difference 
Test statistic (t)  of mean difference 
76.549 
77.899 
















Nores: This table presents an analysis of the mean changes in daily trading volume (in thousands) 
for the marginable and nonmarginable OTC firms following the announcement of the  1972 and 
1974 changes in Federal Reserve margin requirements. The net percentage change in mean trading 
volume is equal to the difference between the mean percentage post- and premargin trading vol- 
ume for the marginable firms, less the difference between the mean post- and premargin percent- 
age trading volume for the nonmarginable firms. 
did decrease by just under 2 percent, the mean trading volume of  the nonmar- 
ginable firms fell by over 7 percent, implying that the mean relative trading 
volume of  the marginable firms increased by approximately 5.5 percent. 
Table 10.9 reports the same statistics for the 15 percent decrease in margin 
levels enacted on January 3,  1974. Similar to the case of the  1972 increase, 
there is only weak evidence that the  1974 decrease in margin requirements 
led to higher trading volumes for the marginable OTC firms relative to their 
nonmarginable counterparts. While the mean daily percentage trading volume 
of  the marginable OTC stocks rose by  13 percent in the postannouncement 
period relative to preannouncement levels, and the mean daily percentage trad- 
ing volume of the nonmarginable firms fell by  17 percent over the same time 
period, the net difference between these two figures is only marginally signifi- 
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10.5.4  Liquidity (Bid-Ask Spread) Tests 
In an effort to determine whether changes in margin levels led to changes in 
the relative  liquidity of the  marginable OTC stocks vis-8-vis their nonmar- 
ginable counterparts, paired difference tests for changes in the mean daily per- 
centage bid-ask spread also are performed via a methodology  similar to the 
paired-volumes tests discussed above. In these tests, the differential change in 
the percentage bid-ask spread for the marginable and nonmarginable firms in 
each OTC firm pair is calculated by subtracting the mean percentage bid-ask 
spread figures for the twenty-five event days before the margin change from 
those for the twenty-five event days following. The net change in the percent- 
age bid-ask spread for each firm pair is then calculated by subtracting the mean 
percentage change in the bid-ask spread for the nonmarginable firm of  each 
pair from that of its matched marginable firm. As before, if the percentage bid- 
ask spread for a given marginable  firm increased  following a given margin 
change relative to its nonmarginable counterpart, this difference will be pos- 
itive. 
While the null hypothesis of no difference in the mean daily percentage bid- 
ask spreads between the marginable and nonmarginable OTC firm pairs seems 
reasonable, there are alternative  hypotheses that could, under certain condi- 
tions, suggest either an increase or decrease in relative spreads or, conceivably 
(in the case of exactly counterbalancing effects) lead to no change at all. In a 
study that presents estimates of two components of the bid-ask spread, Glosten 
and Harris (1988) suggest that changes in the spread arise from the interplay 
of the transitory and adverse-selection components. Thus, by  extension, the 
extent to which the relative bid-ask spread of marginable OTC firms is affected 
by  a change in Federal Reserve margin levels is due in part to the degree to 
which  the  monopoly  profits  generated  by  market  makers  from  liquidity- 
motivated traders are counterbalanced by the profits earned by informed trad- 
ers possessing valuable asymmetric information. Since it is reasonable to posit 
that the quantity of both liquidity- and informationally motivated trades may 
increase (decrease) following the imposition of lower (higher) margin levels- 
the former by virtue of increased (decreased) trading activity in general, the 
latter due to the fact that decreases (increases) in margin levels allow informa- 
tionally motivated margin traders to assume larger (smaller) positions in mar- 
ginable stocks-and  since changes in the  relative  proportions of  these two 
types of  traders  cannot be determined for the sampled stocks over the time 
periods under study, the magnitude and direction of changes in relative bid-ask 
spreads for marginable firms in response to changes in margin levels cannot, a 
priori, be determined. 
The results of the tests of the mean bid-ask spread differences between the 
marginable and nonmarginable OTC firm pairs before and after each of  the 
four margin changes are presented in table 10.10. Similar to the price, volatil- 
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Table 10.10  Bid-Ask Spread Differences between the Marginable and 
Nonmarginable  OTC Firm Portfolios before and after Federal 
Reserve Margin Changes 
Premargin Spread  Postmargin Spread 
Margin 
Change  MAR  NMR  MAR  NMR  Net Change  Test Statistics 
1970  0.05792  0.05017  0.06635  0.06868  -0.01008  -1.87 
(0.00540) 
(0.00274) 
(0.001  74) 
1971  0.04620  0.03681  0.04526  0.03478  0.00109  0.40 
1972  0.03525  0.04033  0.03579  0.03816  0.00270  1.55 
1974  0.07389  0.07838  0.06277  0.07310  -0.00585  -0.90 
(0.00653) 
Notes: This table presents an analysis of the mean changes in the reported closing percentage bid- 
ask spreads for the marginable and nonmarginable OTC firms following the announcement of 
changes in Federal Reserve margin requirements. The net change in the mean percentage bid-ask 
spread is equal to the difference between the mean post- and premargin spreads for the marginable 
firms, less the difference between the mean post- and premargin spreads for the nonmarginable 
firms. The standard errors of these net differences are reported in parentheses. 
the results. While the 1970 and 1974 margin decreases led to reductions in the 
bid-ask  spread for marginable  firms vis-a-vis  their nonmarginable  counter- 
parts, the  1971 margin decrease led to an increase in the spread, as did the 
1972 margin increase. The results remain inconsistent even when measured 
gross of changes in the bid-ask spread of the nonmarginable firm portfolio. In 
this case, the observed mean bid-ask spread rises following the 1970  and 1972 
margin changes and falls after the 1971 and 1974 changes. In no case, however, 
are the observed differences statistically significant. Indeed, only the relative 
bid-ask spread reduction associated with the  1970 decrease in margin levels 
approaches significance at conventional levels. 
10.6  Conclusions 
Recent empirical work on the efficacy of Federal Reserve margin regulation 
typically has been conducted by comparing the price and volatility changes of 
the S&P Composite index concomitant with changes in margin levels. The 
present study represents a unique departure from this approach by exploiting a 
1969 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-an  amendment that 
allowed brokers and dealers to extend margin credit for the purchase of  se- 
lected OTC issues-to  create two separate portfolios of OTC firms similar in 
many  important  respects  (e.g., industry, exchange,  size, debvequity  ratio) 
while differing with respect to the presence  or absence of  Federal Reserve 
margin requirements.  Prior to this development, it was impossible to distin- 
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levels, those adjustments in security market behavior resulting from informa- 
tion effects only from those changes resulting from shifts in binding borrowing 
constraints on equity investors. The results of  the conducted price, volatility, 
volume,  and  liquidity  tests  of  these  matched-pair  marginable  and nonmar- 
ginable OTC firms for the 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1974 Federal Reserve margin 
changes are summarized below. 
Market-adjusted price comparisons of  the marginable and nonmarginable 
OTC firm portfolios failed to document statistically significant differences be- 
tween the two portfolios in a direction consistent with a priori expectations. 
Indeed, rather than the positive (negative) relative price performance for the 
marginable firm  portfolio that would be consistent with the loosening (tight- 
ening) of a binding constraint facing investors  in these securities following 
margin decreases (increases), no statistically significant price reactions were 
observed following either the  1970 margin decrease or the  1972 margin  in- 
crease, while negative and statistically significant relative price performance 
for the marginable firm portfolio was observed following the 1971 and 1974 
margin  decreases. Thus, the results  of  the conducted price tests provide the 
most convincing evidence to date that the security market reactions observed 
in response to Federal Reserve margin changes are due to information effects 
only rather than due to changes in margin-imposed binding constraints on se- 
curity investors. 
Tests for changes in overall return variability provide no evidence of a differ- 
ential effect between  the marginable and nonmarginable firm  portfolios fol- 
lowing the announcement of either margin increases or decreases, rather than 
the increasing (decreasing) relative variability of the marginal OTC firm port- 
folio that would be predicted by the binding constraint hypothesis following 
the announcement of  margin  decreases  (increases). Further,  in findings that 
support  the  earlier results  of  both  Hsieh  and  Miller  (1990) and Ferris and 
Chance (1988), there was no consistent pattern  in even the gross changes in 
volatility of  the marginable OTC firms independent of the effect of nonmar- 
ginable firms, as the volatility of the marginable firms actually fell in the post- 
event period following both the 1971 and 1974 margin decreases. 
Following the pattern established in the price and volatility results discussed 
above, tests of  changes in marginable and nonmarginable OTC firm trading 
volume fail to yield  a picture  consistent with the hypothesis  that decreases 
(increases) in  Federal Reserve margin  levels  should be associated  with  in- 
creases (decreases) in trading volume for marginable equity securities. While 
the trading volume of the marginable firms did fall following the 1972 margin 
increase,  the  volume  of  the  nonmarginable  firms  fell  by  an  even  greater 
amount. Unfortunately, the lack of daily trading volume figures for the  1970 
and 1971 margin changes reduces the extent to which solid inferences may be 
made concerning the direction and magnitude of  changes in marginable and 
nonmarginable OTC firm trading volumes in response to margin changes. 
As mentioned in the discussion of the empirical results, shifts in net direc- 339  Federal Reserve Margin Changes and OTC Stocks 
tion of the interplay between the transitory and adverse-selection components 
of the bid-ask spread make it difficult to predict, a priori, the extent to which 
the relative bid-ask spreads of marginable OTC firms should be affected by a 
change in Federal Reserve margin levels. Given this caveat, tests of the mean 
bid-ask spread differences between the marginable and nonmarginable OTC 
firm pairs before and after each of the four margin changes reveal no consistent 
pattern in the results. The 1970 and  1974 margin decreases led to reductions 
in the bid-ask spread for marginable firms vis-i-vis their nonmarginable coun- 
terparts, and the 1971 margin decrease and the 1972 margin increase led to an 
increase in the spread. In no instance are the observed differences statistically 
significant. 
Taken as a whole, the empirical tests presented in this study offer no support 
for the view that Federal Reserve margin requirements function as originally 
conceived or that  changes  in  margin  levels  are associated with  changes in 
margin-imposed binding constraints on security investors. Rather, in every test 
scenario, the findings of  the study are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
price, volatility, volume, and liquidity effects observed in equity securities in 
response to changes in Federal Reserve margin levels are due to information 
effects only. As such, the results of the study provide powerful and important 
new evidence that the findings of  Hardouvelis (1988,  1990)-findings  pur- 
porting to suggest that margin requirements “seem to be an effective regulatory 
tool”  (1990,  736)-do  indeed  represent  a  significant overstatement  of  the 
strength of the case. 
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Comment  A. Craig MacKinlay 
Over the  years there  has been  considerable  debate concerning the effect of 
margin requirements  for purchasing common equity on the volatility of the 
stock market. Recently, the debate has been active because of arguments that 
margins in the stock index futures market should be the same as margins in the 
cash market.  (See Sofianos [  19881 for details concerning the margin require- 
ments on equity instruments.) The ultimate  question from a policy point of 
view is whether margin requirements represent an effective tool for the Federal 
A. Craig MacKinlay is professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsyl- 
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Reserve to use to control market  volatility. A recent round of  the debate is 
between Hardouvelis (1990) and Hsieh and Miller (1990). Hardouvelis pre- 
sented evidence that margin requirements influence the volatility of the market 
and hence can be a useful tool. However, Hsieh and Miller reexamined Har- 
douvelis’s evidence and find that his results  can be explained by  statistical 
biases. Based on a combination of  this finding and some new analysis, they 
reject his conclusion. In this paper, Pruitt and Tse begin at this point. They add 
to the body of evidence by comparing two samples of OTC stocks; one sample 
is marginable stock and the other sample is nonmarginable. Their results sup- 
port the conclusion of Hsieh and Miller (and much previous work). 
Rather than spend my discussion time on the specifics of the Pruitt and Tse 
paper, I thought it might be useful to step back and ask a few broad questions 
about the margin requirements and stock market volatility debate. These ques- 
tions have not been addressed in previous work. I have divided my thoughts 
into two categories-theoretical  questions and empirical questions, and I will 
deal with these in turn. 
Theoretical Questions 
One shortfall on the theoretical side is the apparent lack of theory with spe- 
cific empirical predictions for the margins and volatility relation. Existing the- 
ory argues that low margin requirements lead to speculative excesses. These 
excesses can introduce the possibility of an initial price drop triggering a pyra- 
miding effect where calls for collateral lead to forced liquidations and further 
price drops. (See Garbade [1982] for a review of these arguments.) Such the- 
ory appears to predict nothing more specific than that lower margin require- 
ments will lead to higher volatility. This has left empiricists with the choice of 
designing tests that only assume that volatility is a decreasing function of mar- 
gin requirements or of adding ad hoc structure (which is usually linear in na- 
ture-see  Officer [1973] for an example). As we shall see in the section on 
empirical questions, this lack of  specificity can make given relations difficult 
to detect. 
Some other questions also come to mind. Why is it that the studies are con- 
cerned only with the initial margin requirements and ignore maintenance mar- 
gins? If  one is concerned with forced liquidations, it seems that the mainte- 
nance margin is of some relevance. However, the lack of study of the role of 
the maintenance margin might be explained by the fact that it has not changed 
in the United States over the time period researchers have drawn upon for their 
empirical analysis. More generally, one might ask, To what extent are margins 
binding at all? Potentially investors can effectively avoid any constraint that 
high margin requirements impose, by  the use of bank lending. If  this is the 
case, then looking for a relation is a fool’s errand. 
Another question is, Where does one expect the effects of margin require- 
ments to appear in terms of volatility changes? Most studies have focused on 
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looking for marketwide effects. However, if margin accounts are concentrated 
in a particular segment of  the market (e.g., low-capitalization stocks), there 
may be more fruitful portfolios to examine. Pruitt and Tse deserve credit here. 
They have gone beyond a broad-based index by using a specific sample of OTC 
stocks. But such a choice is not without costs, as they have only one margin 
change to look at. Related to this is the question of how systematic the effects 
of margin requirements will be. There could be possible benefits from looking 
at the variances of individual stocks rather than the variance of a portfolio of 
stocks. One would like to select stocks with a high  number of  margin pur- 
chasers. 
Empirical Questions 
My empirical questions follow from the issues presented in the theoretical 
questions. In this section I would like to address the likelihood of statistically 
detecting a margin requirements and volatility relation if one did exist. While 
my priors are that none exists, I also suspect that, if one does exist, it will be 
difficult to find. The subsequent analysis draws heavily on the basic framework 
of Hsieh and Miller (1990). Using the history of margin changes from 1934 to 
the present, they consider changes both  individually  and in aggregate. They 
find that, in aggregate, the test they use to detect volatility effects has high 
power, given a “strong negative relation.” I believe further analysis is warranted 
for two reasons. Most important, I find the relation they pose is so strong that 
it  is economically  unrealistic.  For  example,  with  their  alternative  relation, 
when the margin requirements are reduced from 100 percent to 75 percent, the 
variance  of returns increases by 900 percent. Also, they present tests using 
individual changes and do not report on the power of such tests. 
Miller and Hsieh base their analysis on the Levene test. This test is useful 
because it does not require strong distributional assumptions. However, there 
is a potential loss of power with this test because it does not incorporate the 
direction of the volatility change when margins change. To investigate this pos- 
sibility, a one-sided F-test is also included. 
In order to answer the posed question one needs to specify possible alterna- 
tive margin requirements and volatility relations. This is done using the linear 
relation proposed by Hsieh and Miller (1990). They use standard deviation of 
return (u)  to measure volatility and percent initial margin (M)  to measure mar- 
gin requirements. The relation they consider is 
(1)  u  =  O1 -  PM. 
Hsieh and Miller calibrate their model using a monthly interval. The relation 
is completely specified by assigning values to 01  and p. Five cases are consid- 
ered, the null hypothesis (alternative 0) and alternatives I to 4. The parameter 
P is selected to control the strength of the relation. It ranges from 0.000 (null 
hypothesis) to 0.319 (alternative  4). Alternative 4 is the  alternative  used by 
Hsieh and Miller (1990). Given p, the parameter 01  is selected so that the annu- 343  Federal Reserve Margin Changes and OTC Stocks 
alized standard deviation is 23.1 percent when the margin requirement is 40 
percent. The range of parameters is reported in table 1OC.  1, and the relations 
are plotted in figure 1OC. 1. Also reported in table lOC.1 for each alternative is 
the standard deviation of return when M is 100  percent. This value ranges from 
4.0 percent for the Hsieh-Miller  alternative to 23.1 percent for the null hy- 
pothesis. 
I begin with the consideration of detecting volatility effects given a single 
margin change. Hsieh and Miller consider this using the Levene test statistic.l 
Define r,, as the jth observation of  margin requirement regime i. Consider G 
regimes and N observations per regime.’ To construct the statistic, we need the 
absolute deviations from the mean within each regime. Define z, as the mean 
absolute deviation for observation j,  regime i.  Then 
(2) 
where 
z,,  = IT,,  -  TI, 
(3) 






2, = -  &,, 
Under the null hypothesis that the returns are independently and identically 
distributed, L is distributed F[G - 1, G(N - l)] a~ymptotically.~  In the case 
of a single change in margin requirement, G = 2. 
For comparison, the usual F-test using the ratio of the variances of returns 
on each side of the margin requirements change is presented. Let Q be the test 
statistic. Then 
1. Hsieh and Miller use a slight variation of the Levene test statistic because they want to allow 
for heteroskedasticity in the data that is unrelated to margin changes. In the analysis of this paper, 
because all returns are simulated to be  homoskedastic except for the volatility changes due to 
margin changes, the usual Levene test is reported. This difference is likely to bias the results in 
this paper toward overstating the power relative to the test used by Hsieh and Miller. 
2. Because the null distribution is known only asymptotically, for all results presented the null 
critical values are determined by simulation. 
3. In general N can vary across regimes. See Hsieh and Miller (1990). 344  Stephen W.  Pruitt and K. S. Maurice Tse 
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Fig. 10C.l  Margins and volatility relation 
(7) 
where 6; and 6; are the usual maximum likelihood estimators of the variance 
for regimes A and B, respectively. A and B are adjacent regimes, with regime 
A being the one with lower margins. This definition of  regimes captures the 
one-sided nature of the hypothesis. Under the null hypothesis the distribution 
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Table 10C.l  Parameters for Alternative Models of Volatility and Margin 
Requirements 
Alternative  a  P  u[M  = 1001 
0  23.1  O.Oo0  23.1 
1  25.2  0.052  20.0 
2  28.6  0.136  15.0 
3  31.9  0.219  10.0 
4  35.9  0.319  4.0 
Notes: A linear relation between annual standard deviation and margin requirements is assumed. 
The model is u  = a -  PM, where u  is the annual standard deviation, M  is the margin requirement, 
and a and P are the model parameters. p is increased to strengthen the relation, and ct is selected 
so that at M = 40 percent the standard deviation is 23.1 percent. 
The individual change analysis is presented for the four alternatives pre- 
viously described. The number of  observations per regime is set to twenty- 
five. This roughly corresponds to the average number of months per regime 
since 1934. Three margin changes are considered, 45-55  percent, 50-70  per- 
cent, and 75-100  percent. These all represent changes that actually took place. 
Independent and identically distributed returns are simulated within each re- 
gime. The standard deviation of returns for each regime is given by the linear 
volatility and margins relation. In table 10C.2 the power of the two tests at the 
5 percent level of  significance is documented for the four alternatives. Al- 
though the power of  the two tests is similar, throughout the table the (one- 
sided) F-test does dominate the Levene test. As expected, the power of both 
tests is lowest for alternative 1 and the 45-55  percent margin change and the 
highest for alternative 4 and the 75-100  percent margin change. The difference 
in magnitudes is extreme, however, with the power ranging from the size of 
the test to almost  1.0. This illustrates the importance of  the alternative one 
has in mind in assessing the usefulness of the tests. The margin change being 
considered is also important. The power is low for all alternatives when the 
45-55  percent change is considered and is only high for the extreme alterna- 
tives and extreme margin change. In summary, only when extreme changes in 
volatility occur would one expect these tests using individual change events to 
be able to statistically detect the volatility effects. 
Next we address the power of the tests if the margin requirements changes 
are aggregated together. With the Levene statistic this is easily accomplished 
by  setting G to the number of regimes. In the case at hand G = 23 since there 
are twenty-two margin requirements changes over the 1934-to-present  sample. 
To aggregate the F-test, we form a new statistic based on the average of the Q 
statistic across regime  changes. The  size of  the  sample to be  averaged is 
twenty-two. The null hypothesis critical values of this aggregate F-test are de- 
termined by simulation. 
The power of  the aggregate tests are reported in table  10C.3. Results are 
reported for three significance levels, 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent. In 
terms of being able to statistically detect volatility effects, the Levene test has 346  Stephen W. Pruitt and K. S. Maurice Tse 
Table 10C.2  Power of Two Tests at 5 Percent Significance Level for Individual 
Margin Changes 
Change C, 
Change A, 45-55%  Change B, 50-70%  75-100% 
Alternative  L-test  F-test  L-test  F-test  L-test  F-test 
1  0.047  0.053  0.057  0.084  0.062  0.096 
2  0.060  0.080  0.102  0.117  0.145  0.277 
3  0.079  0.128  0. I63  0.219  0.465  0.671 
4  0.094  0.179  0.380  0.403  0.999  0.999 
Norrs: The two tests are the Levene test (L-test) and the F-test. Four alternative hypotheses are 
considered. See table 1OC.l and figure 10C.l for details of  the alternatives. Each cell is based on 
one thousand independent replications. 
Table 10C.3  Power of Two Tests at Various Significance Levels for Twenty-three 
Margin Changes 
Significance Level 
1%  5%  10% 
Alternative  L-test  F-test  L-test  F-test  L-test  F-test 
1  0.014  0.073  0.081  0.226  0.158  0.35  I 
2  0.160  0.600  0.366  0.835  0.495  0.915 
3  0.811  0.999  0.938  1  .ooo  0.973  1.000 
4  1.000  1  .ooo  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Notes: The two tests are the Levene test (L-test) and the aggregate F-test. Four alternative hypothe- 
ses are considered. See table IOC.l and figure 1OC.1 for details of the alternatives. The twenty- 
three margin changes are selected to match the actual margin changes that occurred from October 
15, 1934, to January 3,  1974. The margin ranges from 40 percent to 100 percent. See table  I  of 
Hardouvelis (1990) for the margins and change dates. Each eel1 is based on one thousand indepen- 
dent replications. The finite sample critical values are determined empirically using ten thousand 
replications. 
low power against alternative 1, moderate power against alternative 2,  and high 
power against alternatives 3 and 4. The aggregate F-test displays a similar pat- 
tern but in many cases dominates the Levene test substantially, For example, 
with alternative 2 and a 5 percent significance level, the power of the aggregate 
F-test is 83.5 percent, whereas the power of the Levene test is only 36.6 per- 
cent. Considerable power gains can be achieved by incorporating the inverse 
nature of the margin change and volatility relation. 
One’s satisfaction with the performance of the aggregate tests depends heav- 
ily on the alternative deemed economically reasonable. If one accepts the lin- 
ear relation and views alternative 1 as realistic, the tests are not very useful for 
detecting volatility  effects.  In  contrast,  if  one deems the Hsieh and Miller 
(1990) alternative as realistic, the tests are very useful because they have high 
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Conclusion 
To  summarize, I find the issue of the relation between margin requirements 
and volatility in need of further theoretical modeling. The current theory lacks 
specific predictions. This lack of  specificity leads to difficulties empirically 
designing an informative framework for investigation. For plausible scenarios 
where there is a relation between margin requirements and volatility, with com- 
monly employed tests, one would be unlikely to find such a relation statisti- 
cally. While Pruitt and Tse have made some progress, I believe there is still 
more to be done. 
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COIIUllent  Paul H. Kupiec 
In their paper, Stephen Pruitt and K. S. Maurice Tse (PT) examine the effects 
of  changes  in  margin  requirements  on  the  returns  of  small  capitalization 
stocks. The distinguishing feature of this study is its use of a “matched-pair’’ 
statistical design. The methodology measures the differential impact of a mar- 
gin rate change on selected characteristics of two stocks that, aside from their 
marginability  status, are close substitutes. This methodology  is designed to 
difference out the background noise that might make an underlying margin- 
volatility, margin-price, or margin-liquidity effect difficult to detect. PT inter- 
pret their statistical results as strong evidence against the hypothesis that fed- 
eral margin requirements impose binding constraints on investors. 
Before discussing the specific methodology and results of the PT paper, I 
Paul H. Kupiec is a senior economist in the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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first consider the potential importance of these results for the conduct of fed- 
eral margin policy. The literature investigating the effects of regulation T mar- 
gin changes on the volatility of returns to broad stock market indexes is exten- 
sive.’ The vast majority of margin-volatility studies conclude that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between changes in the Federal Reserve’s 
regulation T margin requirement and subsequent changes in the volatility of 
returns to broad stock market indexes.* 
Suppose for a moment that PT were to find that their matched-pair statistical 
design generated results consistent with  the hypothesis that higher margins 
dampen stock price volatility. Would such a finding imply that margin require- 
ments are an effective tool that can be used to control the volatility of the stock 
market? I would argue not. The stocks included in the PT  sample design are 
among the smallest capitalization stocks investors can trade. If margins affect 
the volatility of the very smallest stocks, it need not follow that margins must 
also affect the aggregate volatility of the stock market. It is possible that mar- 
gins could have effects on the returns of  individual stocks, in this case the 
smallest equity issues, and yet in aggregate have no effect on overall market 
volatility. 
The theoretical results of Kupiec and Sharpe (1991) are useful in explaining 
how there might be a statistical margin-volatility relationship in some individ- 
ual stocks’ returns and yet be no evidence of  an aggregate margin-volatility 
relationship. Kupiec and Sharpe show that an increase in margin requirements 
may cause a risky asset’s volatility to either increase or decrease. Margin re- 
quirements affect volatility by constraining the holdings of investors. If margin 
requirements keep irrationally optimistic investors from bidding a stock’s price 
above its sustainable long-run equilibrium price, an increase in margin require- 
ments  will reduce that asset’s price volatility. Alternatively, margin  require- 
ments may prohibit rational risk-tolerant investors from purchasing additional 
shares when new information causes a share’s price to fall or prohibit these 
investors from short-selling sufficient shares to offset the demands of irratio- 
nally optimistic traders. In either instance, a higher margin requirement will 
increase an asset’s price volatility by restricting the volatility-attenuating de- 
mands of rational investors. Thus, in an economy with heterogeneous invest- 
ors, an increase in margin requirements might have positive effects on the re- 
turn volatility of some shares, negative effects on the return volatility of other 
shares, and, in aggregate, no measurable effect on the return volatility of the 
overall stock market index. 
The upshot of this argument is that the results of a study that measures the 
effects of margin-requirement changes on the volatility of small capitalization 
stocks need not have direct implications for the conduct of margin policy. From 
1. See, for example, Moore (1966); Largay and West (1973); Hardouvelis (1988, 1990); Kupiec 
2. Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) are the only studies that find a statistically significant relationship 
(1989); Salinger (1989); and Hsieh and Miller (1990). 
between margin requirements and the volatility of  a broad index of  stock returns. 349  Federal Reserve Margin Changes and OTC Stocks 
an academic perspective, it might be interesting to know whether federal mar- 
gin policy has an effect on the price volatility and market characteristics of 
small capitalization stocks, but it would not be appropriate to generalize these 
results into statements about the effects of margin changes on the equity mar- 
ket in aggregate. If small capitalization issues were affected by margin require- 
ments,  however, such  a  result  would  be  evidence  that  small capitalization 
stocks have a different investor clientele than the clientele that typically invests 
in large capitalization issues. The finding that investors in small firm shares 
are somehow different from average market investors would be of interest to 
researchers outside the margin-volatility debate. 
The methodological innovation PT bring to the margin-volatility debate is 
the use of the matched-pair statistical design. PT choose stocks on the Federal 
Reserve’s OTC marginable stock list and then match each stock with a nonmar- 
ginable OTC stock in the same four-digit SIC code category. Under the null 
hypothesis that margin requirements have no effect on investors in these issues, 
the differences in price changes, volatility changes, volume changes, and bid- 
ask spread changes for these matched pairs of stocks on dates surrounding 
changes in margin requirements should not be statistically different from zero. 
Notwithstanding PT’s discussion of the advantages of the matched-pair de- 
sign, it is doubtful that this methodology is appropriate for measuring the ef- 
fects of margin changes on marginable OTC stocks. The problem in applying 
the matched-pair  design is that it is unlikely that there exist nonmarginable 
OTC stocks that are close matches for stocks on the Federal Reserve’s OTC 
marginable stock list. One firm’s shares are included in the Federal Reserve’s 
OTC margin list and another firm’s shares are not marginable precisely be- 
cause the characteristics of these firms are different. As discussed by PT, criti- 
cal factors used by the Federal Reserve to determine margin eligibility status 
include minimum capitalization standards, firm age, tenure of listing, average 
share price, the number of active market makers, and the dispersion of share 
ownership. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to match a nonmarginable OTC 
firm with a firm eligible for margin lending unless the Federal Reserve erred 
in classification. Clearly one or more of  the margin eligibility factors differs 
across the firms in each PT matched pair. The assumption that a four-digit SIC 
code is a sufficient statistic for the matching criterion is clearly incorrect. 
Although it is possible that the differences between marginable and nonmar- 
ginable firms in a PT matched pair are minor and have little bearing on the 
analysis, PT do not report statistics that measure the magnitudes of these dif- 
ferences in firm  characteristics. As a consequence, it is unclear exactly how 
completely the paired firms are matched. This issue is important because firm 
returns are almost certainly related to firm size in a systematic way, and they 
may be related to the other characteristics as well.3 Without statistics that sug- 
gest otherwise, the reader must conclude that the PT matching criterion ignores 
3. For example, it is well known that returns to shares in an initial public offer differ in system- 
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these potentially important factors and controls only for an industry factor (and 
the market-model factor) in the return generating process. 
The empirical evidence reported by PT suggests that omitted factors may be 
compromising  the  integrity  of  their  reported  test  statistics.  Consider  the 
margin-requirement price-effect tests reported in tables 10.2-10.5. Each table 
reports the standardized abnormal return estimate difference (SARD)  and the 
cumulative SARD (CARD)  estimates for the margin-change event beginning 
on event day -25. 
In the four separate margin-change events examined, PT find significant evi- 
dence of a price effect in the +25 day CARD statistic only in the 15 percent 
margin-requirement decrease of January 3, 1974. For this event, PT  calculate 
that marginable OTC firms underperformed nonmarginable firms by an aver- 
age 7.21 percent in the fifty-one-day event window. PT  find this negative differ- 
ential return effect of a margin reduction counterintuitive and attribute the re- 
sult (without statistical confirmation) to the so-called small-firm effect. If this 
explanation is correct, it is clear that the PT matched-pair criterion does not 
adequately control for a firm size factor. 
Determining whether or not an omitted small-firm factor is the source of the 
significant CARD in the 1974 margin-change event is critically important. PT 
mistakenly assume that any potential margin-price effect is unidirectional. In 
their view, if investors are constrained by a margin requirement, relaxing the 
requirement could only lead to a higher share price. PT do not recognize that 
margin requirements may prohibit investors from short-selling as many shares 
as they otherwise might desire. Under regulation T, a short sale is treated as a 
loan and a share purchase. For margin purposes, the transaction is treated as if 
the owner of the share sells the security to the short seller and provides the 
short seller financing to purchase the share. Because the financing is collateral- 
ized by  the share being purchased, the size of the loan to the short seller is 
limited by the margin requirement. Effectively, if the margin requirement is 50 
percent, the short seller must post margin collateral equal to 50 percent of the 
value of the shares being sold short? The implication is that a reduction in the 
margin requirement would allow investors to increase short sales that could 
potentially cause share price declines. 
Aside from the  1974 margin-change event, there is other evidence in the 
individual SARD estimates reported in tables 10.2-10.5  that indicate problems 
with PT's statistical methodology. Under the null hypothesis, individual SARD 
estimates are distributed (asymptotically) as normal zero-one variables. An ex- 
amination of the individual SARD estimates suggests that their empirical distri- 
bution does not correspond very closely with this theoretical distribution. Re- 
call that, based upon the fifty-one-day CARD statistics, F'T  conclude that the 
1970 (table 10.2) and 1971 (table 10.3) margin decreases had no measurable 
4.  Since the proceeds of the stock sale are held by the lender and unavailable to the short seller, 
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price effect. Despite the overall insignificance of these events, the tables con- 
tain many extreme-valued SARD estimates. In the eleven days surrounding the 
1970 event date alone, two days have SARD statistics that exceed the 3 percent 
two-tailed critical value. The surplus of extreme-valued SARDs is even more 
evident in the results reported in table 10.3.  The relative abundance of extreme- 
valued SARDs reported by PT may be an an additional  indication of poorly 
matched firms generating omitted-factor contamination in the test statistics. 
After attributing the statistical significance of the 1974 margin change to an 
omitted small-firm factor, PT conclude, “[Tlhe pricing results clearly refute the 
hypothesis that changes in margin requirements are associated with changes in 
binding constraints on security investors.” The methodological problems iden- 
tified in this discussion suggest otherwise. If the matched-pair statistics are not 
biased by omitted factors, then the 1974 margin event is statistical evidence 
that, in some instances, margin requirements do impose binding constraints on 
investors. If omitted factors bias the event test results, the binding-constraint 
hypothesis has not been subjected to an accurate test. 
Although my priors are consistent with the conclusions of PT, the method- 
ological issues raised in this discussion reduce my confidence in the accuracy 
of their reported statistics. The potential statistical problems at issue are im- 
portant, but they may also be relatively easy to address. I encourage the authors 
to consider these issues in any future revision of this paper. 
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Authors’ Reply 
One of the most interesting  aspects of being invited to present a paper at a 
research conference is the generally high variability in the content of the dis- 
cussants’ comments. In their remarks, Paul Kupiec and Craig MacKinlay offer 
further empirical evidence in support of this proposition. As the present reply 
will  show, we believe that many of  Kupiec’s more paper-specific  comments 
are undeservedly critical, while MacKinlay’s more generalized comments rep- 
resent a considerable and insightful research advance. 
The basic premise of our paper is a very simple one. Specifically, we believe 
that the only appropriate test of the effectiveness of changes in stock market 
margin requirements  at reducing “undesirable” security market perturbations 
is between  otherwise  identical  securities  differing  only  with respect  to the 
presence or  absence of Federal  Reserve margin requirements. Indeed, since 
changes in margin requirements  are one of  only a very few discrete policy 
tools that the Federal Reserve has at its disposal to influence general economic 
conditions, it is extremely likely that changes in margin levels will have im- 
portant signaling ramifications, independent of any changes in the overall secu- 
rity lending environment. Thus, without the creation of  separate “marginable” 
and “nonmarginable” stock portfolios, it is impossible to distinguish between 
those adjustments in security market behavior resulting from irzformation ef- 
fects only (that is, effects that are identical across all equity securities) from 
those changes resulting from shifts in binding borrowing constraints on equity 
investors (that is, effects due to changes in the overall security lending environ- 
ment). Our study, by exploiting a 1969 amendment to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934-an  amendment that allowed, for the first time, securities dealers 
and brokers to extend margin credit on selected (but not all) OTC equities- 
is the first specifically designed to effectively differentiate between these ef- 
fects. Such a differential test is extremely important since there is ample evi- 
dence that both changes in Federal Reserve margin levels and inclusion on the 
Federal Reserve’s OTC margin list are associated with statistically significant 
changes in security pricing behavior. The findings of the present study illus- 
trate that price changes around changes in Federal Reserve margin levels are 
the result of information effects only and are not due to changes in binding 
borrowing constraints on equity investors. 
Kupiec  begins  his  comments by  noting  that  we  “examine  the  effects of 
changes in margin requirements on the returns of small capitalization stocks.” 
Yes, the firms included in our sample are relatively small when compared with 
larger, listed firms. However, the purpose of the study was not to study low- 
capitalization stocks per se. Our concentration  on OTC stocks occurred pre- 
cisely because these are the only groups of stocks via which an effective con- 
trol portfolio could be constructed. The fact that the majority of these issues 
are “small” is an important by-product of the study-not  its chief contribution. 
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nonmarginable  portfolios  included  in  the  tests  comprised  the  largest firms 
traded on the OTC market. 
While it is clearly true that studies examining the volatility changes of the 
S&P Composite index in response to changes in margin levels generally find 
no relationship between the two, it is also true (but not generally known) that 
the S&P Composite index consisted  of  only ninety  US.  stocks  until March 
1957. The larger S&P 500 index has been employed in margin tests only over 
the  1957 to  1974 time interval. Almost half  (ten of  twenty-one) the margin 
changes have been tested with an index employing only ninety of the largest 
U.S. firms. It is, therefore, by no means surprising that previous  researchers 
have mined so little from the margin-change vein. It would be surprising only 
if they hadn’t. 
In a direct test of the relationship between firm size and security responses 
of NYSE-listed equities to change in margin levels, Pruitt (1993) clearly docu- 
ments that smaller firms respond to a statistically significantly greater degree 
to the announcement of margin changes than the S&P Composite index. Given 
the known inverse relationship between  firm size and firm leverage and the 
“homemade leverage” arguments of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the known 
inverse relationship between firm size and firm-specific informational asym- 
metries (e.g., Barry and Brown  [1984]), and the known inverse relationship 
between firm size and institutional ownership (e.g., Pruitt and Wei [1989]), it 
is clear that individual margin traders must hold a proportionally larger share 
of the stock of smaller firms. Thus, while it is true that most previous research- 
ers have found no consistent relationship between changes in margin  levels 
and stock return behavior, it is equally clear that these same researchers have 
examined the very index of  securities least likely to illustrate a demonstrable 
margin effect. 
Kupiec’s next  major point  concerns  the efficacy  of  margin  changes in a 
broader context: “Would [finding small firms respond more to margin changes] 
imply that margin requirements are an effective tool that can be used to control 
the volatility of the stock market?’  We argue that it could. Indeed, a careful 
reading of  the Securities Exchange Act of  1934 makes it clear that one of  the 
three important reasons for the passage of margin regulations in the first place 
concerned the protection of unsophisticated investors. While one could argue 
that margin traders are not, by definition, unsophisticated, could the same be 
said for the nonmargin traders investing in heavily margined securities? We 
believe  that margin regulations  were  not enacted to protect margin traders. 
Rather, we believe that they were enacted to keep the trading activities of mar- 
gin traders from adversely affecting less sophisticated nonmargin traders. To 
the extent that changes in margin levels are employed by the Federal Reserve 
to reduce the “undesirable” results of margin trading activity by margin traders 
in smaller firms, the Federal Reserve will have enhanced the safety of nonmar- 
gin traders in these same issues. Thus, a potential and important paradox is 
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ously reduce  “undesirable”  security return  behavior  in  smaller issues while 
failing to lead to any measurable effects in a broader market index, such as the 
S&P Composite. 
Kupiec’s comments concerning our methodology are more relevant. No, the 
methodology is not perfect. None ever is. However, given the extremely high 
costs associated with the hand collection of data, we continue to believe that 
the methodologies employed in the empirical tests are the best that can reason- 
ably be performed. 
Kupiec states that our data-selection criteria “match[es] each (marginable] 
stock with a nonmarginable OTC stock in the same four-digit SIC code cate- 
gory.” This is correct as far as it goes, but it by  no means describes all the 
selection criteria employed. First, we don’t simply grab “any” marginable firm 
included on the  Federal  Reserve’s OTC margin  list. Rather,  all marginable 
firms serve as potential sample firms only because they are included on the 
OTC  margin  list. To  actually  be  included  in  the  study  they  must  then  be 
matched with a nonmarginable OTC firm that itselfis later added to the OTC 
margin list. This latter point is especially critical. Although Kupiec is correct 
in  that there may, in general, be  quite a few differences between  the firms 
included on the Fed’s OTC list and those not included on the list, it almost 
certainly is true that the underlying differences between firms added to the list 
between, say, May and November  1972 must be very slight indeed. Again, all 
ofthejrms included in each of the nonmarginable OTC samples as of a given 
margin change were themselves added to the Fed’s OTC list by the time of the 
next margin change. 
Also ignored in  Kupiec’s discussion  of our research  design is the  actual 
matching procedure employed. While we did match on the basis of four-digit 
SIC codes, this is by no means the only criterion involved in the firm matching. 
Rather,  as is noted  in the  study, in addition  to SIC codes, firms were  also 
matched on the basis of debuequity ratios as well as total sales. Thus, although 
it is clear that our marginablehonmarginable firms are not in point of fact 
perfect substitutes, they are very closely matched indeed. We are not aware of 
a more careful matching procedure  employed  in any research  endeavor em- 
ploying hand-collected data. 
In addition to his general and methodological concerns, Kupiec takes excep- 
tion with our interpretation of the 1974 margin decrease results. In these tests 
we note that the price changes observed for the nonmarginable sample signifi- 
cantly exceed those registered by the marginable sample. Given that this partic- 
ular margin change occurred on January 3, 1974, we correctly interpret this 
differential response as a result of the well-known  small-firm effect. Kupiec, 
on the other hand, suggests that this result may in fact be due to the trading 
behavior of short sellers taking advantage of the lower margin levels. To test 
this hypothesis directly, we divided each firm listed on either the New York or 
the American Stock Exchange into ten market-value deciles as of  January 3, 
1974. We next calculated the abnormal returns of  each of  these deciles em- 0.2 
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ploying a standard market-model  methodology.  Figure 10R.  1 plots these re- 
sults for deciles 1, 3, 5,7,  and 9, while figure 10R.2 provides the same results 
for size deciles 2,4,6,  8, and 10. Even the most casual observer will recognize 
the obvious relationship between firm size and price performance around the 
time of this margin change. Thus, it should be quite clear that our January 1974 
margin-change results are indeed driven by the small-firm effect. The fact that 
such a size differential exists at all does support Kupiec’s conjecture that our 
firm-matching procedure is not entirely capable of eliminating ull nonmargin 
effects between  the two  sets of  firms. However,  the  “relative abundance of 
extreme-valued SARDs reported’ in our study are almost certainly the result 
of the fact that the hand collection of our data set limited the size of our mar- 
ginable and nonmarginable firm portfolios to twenty stocks each. 
In sum, we are sympathetic to the wishes of Kupiec with respect to both a 
larger data set and a more precise  marginablehonmarginable firm-matching 
criteria. Until finer work on the subject is forthcoming, however, we will con- 
tinue to maintain that our study represents the best that has yet to be performed 
on the subject of  the price, volatility, volume, and liquidity effects of changes 
in Federal Reserve margin requirements.  But just how good is the best? It is 
to this issue and, more  specifically, MacKinlay’s insightful  analysis that  we 
address the following brief comments. 
MacKinlay attacks the margin-change, security-response question in an en- 
tirely new and innovative manner. His comments concern the statistical likeli- 
hood of actually detecting a margin-change price volatility relationship should 
one indeed exist.  Drawing  heavily  on the empirical  results  presented  pre- 
viously  by  Hsieh and Miller (1990), MacKinlay establishes  numerically that 
the Levene test employed by  these authors is almost incapable of  detecting 
volatility effects in response to margin changes. In other words, the power of 
their test  statistics is quite low.  While noting  that  the F-statistics  employed 
in the present paper are more powerful  than  the Levene tests, MacKinlay’s 
simulations clearly document that “only when extreme changes in volatility 
occur would one expect these tests using individual change events to be able 
to statistically detect the volatility  effects.” The F-statistics employed in the 
present study are indeed based upon individual margin changes and, as such, 
strongly suggest that our failure to document a statistically significant volatility 
response  between  the marginable  and the nonmarginable  portfolios  may be 
due as much (or more) to low statistical power as an inherent inability on the 
part of margins to influence actual return behavior. Thus, one is forced to con- 
clude that, even if the current study is indeed the best yet performed concerning 
the margin-change price behavior question, it may not be good enough to fi- 
nally put it to rest. 
While  specifically addressed  only to our volatility  tests, one could ask if 
similar things could not be said concerning  our price, volume, and liquidity 
tests as well. We believe  not. Indeed, detailed  simulation  studies by Brown 
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methodologies employed  in  the  present  (and  similar) studies. While by  no 
means all-powerful, such tests have repeatedly (and accurately) been employed 
to assess the valuation effects of a variety of economic phenomena. Thus, our 
failure to identify a statistically significant differential price response between 
the marginable and nonmarginable OTC stock portfolios around the time of 
Federal Reserve margin changes is more than likely due to a lack of such a 
differential effect rather than a paucity of  statistical power. Given their basis 
in such event-type models, we believe that similar things could be said for our 
volume and liquidity tests as well. Unfortunately, as we note in the study, the 
lack of a firm unidirectional hypothesis concerning our liquidity tests renders 
these tests interesting, but largely meaningless. 
We  agree with MacKinlay that more theoretical work on the relationship 
between stock prices, volatility, volume, and liquidity is needed. Kupiec’s own 
work on this area is especially interesting in this respect. We continue to be- 
lieve that our  study  is the best yet performed.  We believe that it addresses 
and, in some cases, answers several important questions concerning the current 
status of margin regulation. However, we must agree with MacKinlay when he 
states in his comments that “there is still more [work] to be done.” 
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